Arabs Dismissed M-51 Sherman as Obsolete—Then Israeli HEAT Rounds Destroyed Dozens of T-54s…

June 1967, Egyptian tank commanders watched through their optics as a column of antiquated tanks approached across the Sinai desert. World War II relics, Shermans, the same tanks their grandfathers might have read about in history books. Inside their modern T-54s and T-55s, protected by over 100 mm of sloped steel armor and armed with powerful 100 mm guns, these crews felt invincible. According to documented reports from the Six-Day War, Egyptian forces dismissed the threat entirely. They had superior armor, superior firepower, superior everything.

But within hours, dozens of these Soviet-made tanks would be burning wrecks in the desert sand, destroyed by shells fired from tanks that first rolled off assembly lines before many of their crews were even born. The weapon that made this possible wasn’t magic. It wasn’t luck. It was engineering brilliance combined with tactical necessity. The M51 Sherman, armed with a French-designed 105mm gunfiring high explosive anti-tank rounds, proved that in armored warfare, the deadliest weapon isn’t always the newest one.

Sometimes it’s the most unexpected. This is the story of how Israeli military engineers transformed obsolete American tanks into T54 killers. How heat round technology turned armor thickness into an irrelevant statistic and how tactical innovation defeated numerical and technological superiority in some of the most intense tank battles of the Cold War era. The story begins not with victory but with desperation. By the late 1950s, Israel faced an existential threat. Soviet arms shipments flooded into Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

Modern tanks, modern aircraft, modern everything. Meanwhile, Israeli armored forces relied heavily on World War II surplus, primarily M4 Sherman medium tanks acquired from France and the United States. Analysis conducted by Israeli Defense Force planners revealed a terrifying reality. Their existing armored vehicles could not penetrate the frontal armor of Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks at combat ranges. The 75 mm and 76 mm guns mounted on standard Shermans were designed to fight panzer fees and Tigers, not cold war main battle tanks with advanced metallurgy and sloped armor geometry.

The United States, concerned about upsetting the delicate balance of power in the Middle East, refused to supply M47 patents to Israel. The British, after years of rejections, finally agreed to sell Centurion tanks in 1959, but only in limited numbers and armed with the 20 lb gun rather than the newer 105mm L7.

Israeli military planners knew they needed a stop gap solution. something that could be fielded quickly, something that could give their tank crews a fighting chance against Soviet armor, something unexpected. The answer came from an unlikely partnership with France. Bourge’s arsenal, having previously collaborated with Israel on the M50 Sherman project, which upgraded the tank with a French 75mm gun, was approached with a more ambitious proposal. Israeli specifications were clear and demanding. They needed a gun powerful enough to defeat 100 mm of sloped armor at combat ranges.

They needed it mounted in a Sherman chassis, and they needed it done fast. French engineers had been developing the CN 105 F1 cannon for their new AMX30 main battle tank. This weapon represented cuttingedge tank gun technology. At 56 caliber lengths, firing at velocities approaching 1,000 meters/s, it could penetrate armor that would shrug off anything the Sherman had previously carried. But mounting such a powerful weapon in a World War II era turret presented extraordinary challenges. The first prototype attempted to use the AMX30s gun with minimal modifications.

Testing revealed immediate problems. The recoil forces were too extreme. The turret ring couldn’t handle the stress. The entire system was unworkable. Tank commanders reported that firing the weapon felt like the turret might tear itself apart. Clearly, a different approach was necessary. Engineers returned to their drafting boards. The solution required compromising some performance to gain reliability and practical functionality. They shortened the barrel from 56 caliber lengths to 51. This reduced muzzle velocity slightly, but dramatically decreased recoil forces.

They redesigned the muzzle brake, creating a more efficient system that looked similar to the one used on the Panhard AML90s 90 mm gun. The result was designated the D1508. And when Israeli test crews fired it from a modified Sherman turret, they found it worked. Not perfectly, not elegantly, but it worked. According to documentation from Bourj’s Arsenal, each gun barrel was marked with its specifications CN 10005 period L_51_IS followed by the serial number and manufacturer. That is designation stood for Israel.

These weren’t surplus weapons. These weren’t export rejects. These were purpose-built guns manufactured specifically for mounting in Sherman tanks to fight Arab armor in the desert. The gun alone wasn’t enough. The T-23 turret, originally designed for the Sherman’s 76 mm gun, needed extensive modification. Engineers added a massive cast iron counterweight to the rear of the turret to balance the longer, heavier cannon. The mantlet was completely redesigned to accommodate the larger breach. French production smoke grenade launchers were added.

New radio systems were installed. A search light was mounted for night operations. The modifications made the turret almost unrecognizable compared to its original configuration. For the Hull, Israeli workshops standardized on the M4A1 variant. This model offered the largest internal volume for ammunition storage, critical given that the 105 mm rounds were substantially larger than previous Sherman ammunition. The horizontal Volute spring suspension system with its wider tracks was retrofitted to all production vehicles. This helped distribute the increased weight and maintain mobility despite the tank now weighing approximately 40 tons, significantly more than the original 30 ton design specification.

Between 1961 and 1965, approximately 180 Sherman tanks were converted to M51 standard in Israeli workshops. Crews who trained on these upgraded vehicles reported mixed feelings. The gun was undeniably powerful. The heat ammunition could theoretically penetrate 300 mm of armor at 60° angles. But the tank itself remained fundamentally a World War II design. The armor was thin. The mobility was adequate, but not impressive. The reliability of the Continental R975 radial engine, already obsolete in the 1940s, was questionable at best.

Most concerning was the lack of a stabilizer on the main gun. Unlike the original Sherman 76 mm armament, which featured a basic stabilization system, the M51’s powerful cannon could not fire accurately while moving. Tank commanders had to stop, aim, fire, then move again. Against opponents with modern fire control systems and stabilized guns, this represented a critical vulnerability. But they had one advantage nobody expected. The ammunition made the difference. High explosive anti-tank rounds, commonly called heat, function on principles completely different from traditional armor-piercing projectiles.

Conventional kinetic energy penetrators rely on mass and velocity. They punch through armor by brute force with effectiveness degrading based on impact angle, armor thickness, and projectile velocity. Heat rounds work by shaped charge explosive effect. Upon impact, the explosive charge collapses a metal liner into a hypersonic jet of molten metal and plasma. This jet traveling at velocities up to 8 km/s doesn’t push through armor. It burns through, melts through. The penetration is purely kinetic at microscopic scale, but the effect is devastating.

The OCC 105 F1 heat round used by the M51 could penetrate 300 mm of rolled homogeneous armor at 60° angles. Documentation shows the round weighed 17.3 kg as a projectile with total weight including propellant of 24.8 kg. Muzzle velocity was 950 m/s. These numbers meant something terrifying for Soviet tank crews. The frontal armor of a T-54 or T-55, approximately 100 mm thick at steep angles, offered no protection whatsoever. The side armor, only 60 to 80 mm, was completely inadequate.

Even the turret, the most heavily armored component, couldn’t stop the shaped charge jet. Every single millimeter of a T-54, was vulnerable to the M51’s main armament at combat ranges. Israeli tank crews underwent intensive training on the new vehicles. Gunnery instructors emphasized speed and accuracy. Without stabilization, the M51 had to rely on superior crew training and tactical positioning. Commanders learned to identify favorable firing positions. Gunners practiced rapid target acquisition and engagement. Loaders drilled on maintaining maximum rate of fire despite the cramped turret and heavy ammunition.

Drivers learned to position the tank quickly, stop smoothly for firing, then maneuver immediately after the shot. The entire crew had to function as a synchronized unit. There was no room for hesitation, no opportunity for second chances. By early 1967, the Israeli Defense Force had approximately 177 M51 Shermans in active service out of a total of 515 Sherman-based vehicles. These tanks equipped several armored brigades, though they were increasingly relegated to secondary roles as more modern centurions and M48 patents entered service.

Israeli military leadership viewed the M51 as a stop gap measure, a temporary solution until sufficient quantities of truly modern armor could be acquired. Nobody imagined these aging tanks would soon prove their worth in one of history’s most decisive armored campaigns, but Arab armies were preparing for war. And those preparations would create exactly the circumstances where the M51’s unique characteristics would shine. Egyptian military buildup accelerated dramatically in spring 1967. Soviet advisers helped plan defensive positions throughout the Sinai Peninsula.

Hundreds of tanks, including modern T-54s, T-55s, and even some T62s, moved into carefully prepared positions. Artillery imp placements covered likely Israeli approach routes. Minefields stretched for kilometers. Infantry dug elaborate trench systems. According to intelligence assessments, Egyptian forces deployed approximately 900 to 950 tanks in the Sinai supported by 1100 armored personnel carriers and 1,000 artillery pieces. The defensive strategy relied on superior numbers and favorable terrain to bleed Israeli armored forces in costly frontal assaults. The T-54 and T-55 formed the backbone of Arab armored forces.

These Soviet designed medium tanks represented the first generation of postwar armor development. The T-54 entered service in 1946 with the improved T-55 following in 1957. Both featured a low silhouette hull with sloped armor, a dome-shaped turret, and the powerful 100 mm D10T rifled gun. This weapon had an effective range approaching 2,000 m and fired several types of ammunition, including armor-piercing and high explosive rounds. Tank Archives documentation indicates the D10T could penetrate 185 mm of armor at 1,000 m with optimal ammunition.

The T-55 incorporated several improvements over the T-54. The V-55 diesel engine produced 580 horsepower, giving the tank a maximum road speed of 48 kmh and operational range of 450 km. The ammunition capacity increased from 34 to 43 rounds through innovative use of fuel tanks that could store both diesel and projectiles. An NBC protection system provided defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Infrared night vision equipment gave Soviet tanks capability for 24-hour operations. On paper, these specifications made the T-54 and T-55 formidable opponents for any Western tank of the early 1960s, let alone upgraded World War II vehicles.

Arab tank crews received Soviet training emphasizing discipline and standard operating procedures. Soviet doctrine focused on mass armored assaults supported by artillery preparation. Individual crew initiative was discouraged in favor of coordinated unit movement following predetermined plans. This approach worked well when everything went according to plan. It proved catastrophically brittle when plans fell apart. But in May 1967, Egyptian commanders felt confident. They had numbers. They had modern equipment. They had prepared defensive positions. Israeli armor would shatter against their defenses like waves against a breakwater.

Or so they believed. Israeli intelligence monitored the Egyptian buildup with growing alarm. Reconnaissance flights photographed the extensive fortifications. Agents reported troop movements and equipment concentrations. Military planners understood that war was inevitable. The question wasn’t whether to fight, but when and how. Israeli strategy emphasized preemptive action and rapid offensive operations. Rather than waiting for Arab armies to attack, Israeli Defense Force leadership decided to strike first. Destroy Egyptian air power on the ground, then unleash armored divisions into the Sinai before the enemy could react.

Speed and aggression would compensate for inferior numbers and older equipment. At least that was the theory. June 5th, 1967, 0800 hours, Israeli Air Force fighter bombers struck Egyptian airfields across the country in Operation Focus. The meticulously planned attacks caught Egyptian forces completely offguard. Within 3 hours, the Israeli Air Force destroyed over 300 Egyptian aircraft, most while still parked on runways. Egyptian air defense, despite sophisticated Soviet equipment and extensive preparations, proved unable to react effectively to the coordinated strikes.

With Egyptian air power effectively eliminated, Israeli armor began rolling into the Sinai desert. The ground war had begun. General Israel Tal’s armored division struck northward, aiming to break through the fortified Egyptian positions at Rafa and Khan Ununas, then advanced toward Elish, the northern gateway to Sinai. Tal’s forces included Centurion and M48 patent tanks alongside older Shermans. The initial assault met fierce resistance. Egyptian defenders recovering from the shock of losing their air cover fought tenaciously. Anti-tank guns positioned in prepared imp placements knocked out several Israeli tanks in the first hours of fighting.

Minefields channeled attacking armor into kill zones where Egyptian gunners had excellent fields of fire. Israeli crews quickly learned that desert warfare against prepared defenses was brutal, costly, and unforgiving. But the breakthrough eventually came. Superior training and aggressive leadership allowed Israeli forces to identify weak points in Egyptian lines. Tank companies maneuvered through gaps, attacking defensive positions from unexpected angles. By nightfall on June 5th, Tal’s division had penetrated the first line of Egyptian defenses, but dozens of kilometers of fortified positions still lay ahead.

Further south, General Ariel Sharon’s division launched attacks against the Abu Agala stronghold. This position controlled the central approach route to the Suez Canal and was defended by approximately 8,000 Egyptian soldiers supported by extensive fortifications. Three lines of trenches stretched 5 km in length, spaced nearly 1 kilometer apart. Soviet 130 mm artillery pieces positioned at Umkatef Hill provided fire support. Egyptian reserves including a regiment of 66 T3485 tanks and a battalion of 22 SU00 tank destroyers waited behind the front lines ready to counterattack any breakthrough.

Intelligence assessments indicated Abu Agala represented one of the strongest Egyptian defensive positions in the entire Sinai. A frontal assault would be catastrophic. Sharon planned a complex night attack using combined arms coordination. Paratroopers would assault Ukatef Hill by helicopter, destroying the artillery. Infantry would infiltrate through the trenches under cover of darkness. armor would circumvent the main defenses and intercept the reserves when they moved forward to counterattack. The plan required precise timing and flawless execution. According to documented accounts, the operation began on the night of June 5th.

The 14th Armored Brigade, equipped with M50 and M51 Shermans, along with Centurion tanks from the 63rd Armored Battalion, moved into position. Approximately 150 Israeli tanks participated in the assault. Darkness provided concealment as the armor advanced. Paratroopers landed near Om Katef and quickly overwhelmed the Egyptian artillery positions. The sudden loss of fire support disrupted Egyptian defensive plans. Infantry supported by M3 halftracks began clearing the trench systems in close quarters combat. Then Egyptian reserves began their counterattack exactly as Israeli planners had anticipated.

66 T3485 tanks and 22 SU00 tank destroyers advanced toward the sound of battle. They expected to crush disorganized Israeli infantry and restore the defensive line. Instead, they ran directly into the Shermans of the 14th Armored Brigade positioned in ambush. The battle erupted between 400 and 700 hours on June 6th. Egyptian armor advancing in column formation along predictable routes came under fire from Israeli tanks in prepared positions. The engagement pitted obsolete against obsolete. T3485s designed in 1944 versus Sherman’s first produced in 1942 but upgraded with 105 mm guns.

But the upgraded armament and superior crew training made all the difference. Israeli gunners targeted the less protected sides and rear of advancing Egyptian tanks. Heat rounds punched through armor that might have resisted kinetic energy penetrators. Egyptian tank crews, following Soviet doctrine emphasizing forward advance rather than tactical flexibility, continued moving into the kill zone even as vehicles erupted in flames around them. The SU00 tank destroyers with their powerful 100 mm guns might have posed a serious threat in different circumstances, but caught in the open by prepared defenders with superior fields of fire, they never had the opportunity to leverage their firepower advantage.

According to afteraction reports, the Egyptians lost more than 60 tanks during this engagement. Israeli losses totaled 19 tanks, eight destroyed in the actual battle, while the other 11 Centurions were disabled in minefields and later recovered. Seven Israeli tank crew members died alongside 42 infantry soldiers. Egyptian casualties exceeded 2,000 killed. The dramatic loss ratio demonstrated several critical factors. Superior training mattered more than equipment age. tactical positioning overcome numerical superiority, and the M51’s heat ammunition proved devastatingly effective against Soviet armor when employed correctly.

When news of Abu Agala’s fall reached Egyptian high command, Field Marshal Muhammad Amare ordered a general retreat to positions near the Suez Canal. This decision, made without proper coordination or preparation, transformed an organized defense into a chaotic route. Egyptian units that received the order withdrew immediately, often abandoning heavy weapons and equipment. Other units, never receiving the order or receiving contradictory instructions, remained in position. The breakdown of command and control created exactly the conditions Israeli armor could exploit most effectively.

Israeli commanders recognized the opportunity immediately. Rather than methodically reducing remaining Egyptian strong points, armored columns raced westward toward the Suez Canal, attempting to cut off and trap retreating Egyptian forces. This strategy, if successful, would destroy Egyptian military capability for years while capturing massive quantities of equipment. But the rapid advance created its own problems. Supply lines stretched to the breaking point. Tanks ran out of fuel kilometers from objectives. Ammunition stocks depleted faster than resupply could keep pace. Individual tank companies found themselves isolated deep in enemy territory with minimal support.

These circumstances would create some of the war’s most desperate encounters where small numbers of Israeli tanks faced overwhelming numerical odds and nobody expected Shermans to play such a critical role. Lieutenant Colonel Zeve Eton commanded the 19th light tank battalion equipped with AMX1375 light reconnaissance tanks. On June 6th, his unit found itself as the only Israeli force with fuel and ammunition in position to block an Egyptian counterattack forming near Bergafa. Eton deployed 15 AMX13s along the dunes and waited.

Egyptian intelligence had identified the Israeli fuel shortage and saw an opportunity. 50 to 60 T-54 and T-55 tanks advanced toward Israeli positions, intending to exploit the temporary weakness before reinforcements arrived. The AMX13, armed with only a 75mm gun and protected by thin armor designed for reconnaissance rather than combat, was completely outmatched by the T-54’s 100 mm gun and heavy armor. The French light tanks never had a chance in a straight fight. The battle went exactly as physics and armor thickness predicted.

Egyptian tanks opened fire at ranges where the AMX13’s gun couldn’t penetrate T-54 frontal armor. Israeli return fire bounced harmlessly off Soviet steel. An M3 halftrack carrying ammunition and fuel exploded, destroying several nearby AMX13s and forcing the survivors to withdraw. The 19th Light Tank Battalion lost most of its vehicles without destroying a single Egyptian tank. But the light tanks had accomplished their mission. They delayed the Egyptian advance long enough for help to arrive. That help came in the form of M50 and M51 Shermans from the 14th Armored Brigade.

Tank crews frantically refueled their vehicles and loaded ammunition even as the sound of battle grew louder. According to veterans accounts, Sherman commanders could see smoke from burning AMX13s in the distance. They knew Egyptian T-54s were advancing. They knew those tanks outgunned and outarmored everything they had except their heat ammunition. Engines roared to life. Radioetss crackled with movement orders. The Shermans rolled forward toward the sound of guns. Egyptian tank commanders, confident after easily defeating the French light tanks, expected similar success against more antiquated Allied armor.

Their intelligence briefings emphasized the Sherman’s thin armor and obsolete guns. Soviet advisers had assured Arab crews that T-54s were invulnerable to World War II era weapons. Nobody had warned them about heat rounds fired from 105 mm guns. The Shermans didn’t attack frontally. Israeli commanders understood their tanks couldn’t survive direct engagement against prepared T-54s. Instead, they maneuvered rapidly through the desert, using terrain for concealment, positioning themselves on the flanks of the Egyptian column. This tactical approach transformed the engagement from a contest of armor thickness and gunpower into an ambush where positioning and surprise determined the outcome.

When Israeli gunners opened fire, they targeted the less protected sides of T-54s and T-55s. The shaped charged jets from heat rounds punched through 60 to 80 mm of side armor as if it wasn’t there. Internal explosions followed as penetrating jets ignited ammunition or fuel. Tanks brewed up. Turrets blown off by catastrophic ammunition detonations. Egyptian crews who survived the initial penetration bailed out, abandoning their vehicles rather than face the invisible enemy, destroying them from unexpected angles. Confusion paralyzed the Egyptian formation.

Tank commanders couldn’t identify where fire was coming from. Soviet doctrine didn’t prepare them for this scenario. The training emphasized frontal armor and direct engagement. Nobody had adequately explained how to respond to flanking attacks by tanks that should have been museum pieces. The surviving T-54s and T-55s attempted to maneuver to face the threat, but Sherman mobility and crew training allowed the Israeli tanks to maintain favorable angles. Each time Egyptian tanks rotated toward one Sherman position, other Israeli vehicles fired from different directions.

The crossfire turned the engagement into a shooting gallery. Within minutes, dozens of Soviet built tanks were burning. The survivors retreated toward Ismaelia. Their retreat route took them directly into the 12th centurans of the 31st Armored Division, which finished destroying the formation. The entire Egyptian counterattack collapsed. That evening, the Israeli 200th Armored Brigade attacked Egyptian positions defending Jabel Libnney Air Base in central Sinai. The base already rendered unusable by Israeli Air Force bombardment was defended by the Egyptian 141st Armored Brigade and Elite Palace Guards units equipped with modern T-55 tanks.

Egyptian commanders deployed their forces in prepared defensive positions with excellent fields of fire across the open desert approaches. They had time to range their guns and prepare firing solutions for likely avenues of approach. When Israeli tanks appeared on the horizon, Egyptian gunners opened fire immediately. The problem was range and training. Soviet doctrine emphasized firing at detected threats, but Egyptian gunners lacked adequate training in long range gunnery. Shells kicked up sand hundreds of meters short or sailed overhead.

The barrage achieved nothing except alerting Israeli crews that they were under fire. Israeli tank commanders ordered halt. Gunners acquired targets through their optics. Range estimation, always critical in desert warfare, where distances deceive the eye, relied on extensive training and experience. Israeli gunners had practiced their craft for thousands of hours. They understood how to use terrain features for ranging, how to read mirage effects in the desert heat, how to estimate distance based on target appearance through optics. When they fired, their shells flew true.

But the T-55’s heavily sloped frontal armor, approximately 100 mm thick at 60°, proved effective even against heat rounds at extreme range. Israeli crews watched their rounds impact and failed to penetrate. The shaped charge jets, while devastatingly effective against properly presented armor, lost effectiveness when hitting extreme angles at maximum range. Physics and geometry conspired to protect the Egyptian tanks. Israeli armor had to close the distance. Under fire, across open ground, every meter advanced increased vulnerability. The 200th armored brigade and supporting seventh armored brigade began their approach.

As darkness fell, night operations negated some of the Egyptian defensive advantages. Soviet night vision equipment in 1967 was adequate but not exceptional. Israeli crews, while lacking sophisticated night vision beyond basic infrared systems, compensated through aggressive maneuver and tactical audacity. The brigades didn’t advance directly toward Egyptian guns. Instead, they used the darkness to circumvent the prepared positions entirely. Egyptian defenders found themselves receiving fire from their flanks and rear. The carefully prepared firing solutions and ranged positions became useless when attackers appeared from unexpected directions.

The battle raged throughout the night. Muzzle flashes illuminated the desert darkness. Tracers arked across the sand. Tank ammunition exploded in brilliant fireballs visible for kilometers. Egyptian crews fought bravely but couldn’t overcome the fundamental collapse of their defensive strategy. When dawn broke on June 7th, 30 T-55 tanks remained burning in their positions. The survivors fled westward. Jabel Libnney fell to Israeli forces. The entire Egyptian defensive strategy in central Sinai had collapsed in less than 48 hours. Israeli armor now ranged freely across territory that had been heavily fortified days before.

But the war was far from over, and the M51 Sherman would face its most intense combat in battles yet to come. Analysis of the Sinai campaign reveals several factors that enabled M51 success against superior Soviet armor. First and most important was ammunition technology. Heat rounds effectively negated the T-54 and T-55’s armor advantage. Thickness and slope mattered far less against shaped charge penetrators than against kinetic projectiles. Egyptian crews who felt invincible behind 100 mm of steel discovered that protection meant nothing when the enemy’s ammunition punched through as if it wasn’t there.

Second, crew training and tactical flexibility proved decisive. Israeli tank commanders who understood how to maneuver for flank shots, who recognized when to break off engagement and reposition, who could coordinate fire with other vehicles, consistently defeated Egyptian crews following rigid Soviet doctrine. Third, combined arms coordination multiplied Israeli effectiveness. The Abu Agala assault demonstrated how infantry, artillery, paratroopers, and armor working in synchronization could dismantle defensive positions that would resist any single arm operating alone. But technological and tactical advantages couldn’t completely overcome numerical reality.

The Egyptian army deployed nearly 1,000 tanks into Sinai. Even with catastrophic losses, hundreds remained operational. If Egyptian command and control had remained intact, if units had maintained cohesion, if leaders had adapted to rapidly changing circumstances, the sheer weight of numbers might have ground down Israeli armor through attrition. Instead, the premature retreat order and subsequent breakdown of organization transformed what could have been an organized fighting withdrawal into panicked route. Egyptian units abandoned equipment rather than destroy it. Tank crews fled west, leaving operational vehicles in their positions.

When Israeli forces reached the Suez Canal, they discovered intact Egyptian tanks simply parked and abandoned. crews nowhere to be found. This collapse of morale and discipline was as decisive as any tactical victory. By June 10th, when the ceasefire took effect, Egyptian losses in Sinai exceeded 700 tanks. Over 100 were captured intact and subsequently entered Israeli service as Tyran tanks after modification and repair. Israeli losses totaled 122 tanks on the Sinai front. approximately one-third of which were recovered and returned to service after the war.

The victory was comprehensive, stunning, and for Arab military forces, completely unexpected. Soviet advisers who had assured their students that T-54s were invulnerable to Western World War II era equipment struggled to explain how 60-year-old Sherman chassis had destroyed modern Soviet armor. The answer lay not in the chassis, but in what Israeli ingenuity had mounted on that chassis. The Jordanian front saw similar successes for Israeli Sherman units. The 10th Harel mechanized brigade attacking hills north of Jerusalem included 48 Shermans among its 80 tanks.

Narrow mountain roads and extensive Jordanian minefields slowed the advance dramatically. Mine detectors had all been sent to Sinai units, forcing Israeli sappers to probe for mines manually using bayonets and individual weapons. This agonizingly slow process left Israeli armor exposed to Jordanian artillery. Seven Shermans and the brigade commander M3 halftrack were disabled by mines in the first hours of the offensive. All 16 accompanying Centurion tanks became stuck in rocks or damaged their tracks on the rough mountain terrain during night movement.

Only six Shermans, some M3 halftracks and panhard AML armored cars reached their objectives on the morning of June 6th. Those six tanks immediately encountered Jordanian M48A1 patent tanks. Two Jordanian armored companies had arrived during the night. The M48A1, armed with a 90mm gun and protected by significantly more armor than a Sherman, represented a serious threat. In a frontal engagement, the Americanmade patents would have systematically destroyed World War II era Shermans, but Israeli tank commanders refused to fight on Jordanian terms.

The Shermans maneuvered rapidly, using terrain and buildings for concealment, targeting the M48’s vulnerable external fuel tanks and thinner side armor. Within minutes, six Jordanian patents were disabled or destroyed. The survivors retreated toward Jericho, abandoning 11 more M48s along the route due to mechanical failures. The engagement demonstrated yet again that superior equipment meant nothing when inferior tactics meant superior training and aggressive maneuver. Further north near Janon, the Uggda brigade with 48 M50 and M51 Shermans faced Jordanian defenses anchored by 44 M47 patent tanks.

Night operations in mountainous terrain created chaotic conditions where individual tank platoon found themselves isolated from parent units. One platoon of six or seven M50 and M51s commanded by Lieutenant Matka advanced through olive groves in near total darkness. The platoon commander’s search light mounted above his Sherman’s cannon suddenly illuminated an entire Jordanian armored company equipped with M47 patents positioned less than 50 m away. Both forces were equally surprised by the encounter. The Israelis reacted first. Point blank range negated every advantage the Jordanian patents possessed.

Israeli gunners couldn’t miss at that distance. Heat rounds penetrated the M47’s armor effortlessly. Over a dozen Jordanian tanks were destroyed within minutes before the survivors fled. Israeli losses were one M50 with no crew casualties. The engagement lasted perhaps 5 minutes, but demonstrated the importance of crew reaction speed and training. The Jordanians had superior equipment and favorable positions, but the Israelis had faster reflexes and better training, which at 50 m distance was all that mattered. The 6-day war established the M51 Sherman’s reputation as an effective tank destroyer despite its age.

Approximately 100 M51s participated in the war alongside several hundred other Sherman variants. Israeli tankers who crewed these vehicles developed deep respect for the 105 mm guns hitting power while remaining acutely aware of the chassis’s vulnerabilities. Thin armor meant any penetrating hit was likely fatal. Lack of stabilization meant exposing the tank to fire while stopped for accurate shooting. Limited ammunition capacity of 47 rounds meant conservation of fire and supply discipline. The Continental Radial Enginees reliability issues meant maintenance crews worked around the clock keeping vehicles operational.

But when Israeli tank crews needed to destroy T-54s, T-55s, M47s, or M48s, the M51’s heat rounds delivered consistently. That reliability justified continued service despite ongoing modernization efforts. The post-war period saw continuous M-51 upgrades. The problematic Continental engine was finally replaced with the Cumins VT8460 diesel, significantly improving reliability and range. The exhaust system was redesigned multiple times to improve engine cooling. Additional machine guns were mounted for defense against infantry. A 60 mm mortar was added to the turret roof for indirect fire support.

A lesson learned from encounters with Egyptian infantry anti-tank teams. Infrared night vision equipment was installed for driver and commander. External storage boxes were expanded to carry more equipment and supplies. By 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched their surprise attack in the Yom Kapour War, M51s looked substantially different from their 1967 configuration, but the fundamental vehicle remained the same. An upgraded World War II tank pressed into service because Israel couldn’t acquire sufficient numbers of modern armor. October 6th, 1973.

Yom Kapor, the holiest day in Judaism. Egyptian and Syrian forces launched simultaneous surprise attacks against Israeli positions in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The timing was deliberate. Most Israeli soldiers were on leave for the religious holiday. Reserve mobilization would take time. Arab planners knew they had a narrow window before Israeli numerical and qualitative advantages could be brought to bear. They intended to use that window to inflict maximum casualties and seize territory, then negotiate from a position of strength.

Soviet advisers had spent six years helping Egypt and Syria prepare for this moment. New equipment, new tactics, new training. This time would be different. or so they believed. Israeli forces were caught completely offguard. Reserve units scrambled to mobilize. Tank crews rushed to storage depots to collect their vehicles. Among the tanks rolled out of storage were approximately 341 M50 and M51 Shermans. Frontline armored brigades equipped with modern Centurions and M60 Patton deployed to crisis points. The Shermans went to secondary sectors or reinforced units taking heavy casualties.

Israeli military leadership understood these upgraded World War II tanks were obsolete by 1970s standards. But desperate times required using everything available. And the M-51’s 105mm gun could still destroy Syrian T-55s and T-62s if crews could get into favorable firing positions. The Golan Heights front erupted into some of the war’s most intense armored combat. Syrian forces deployed approximately 900 tanks, including T-54s, T-55s, and the newer T62, armed with a 15 mm smooth boore gun. Israeli forces in the sector initially numbered only 177 Centurion Chotcal tanks.

The numerical disparity was staggering, nearly 5:1 in Syria’s favor. Syrian T62 tanks equipped with night vision equipment attacked after dark on October 6th. Israeli Centurions lacked comparable night fighting capability and struggled to engage targets they couldn’t properly see. Syrian formations broke through several Israeli defensive positions in the first hours of fighting, penetrating deep into Israeli held territory. The situation appeared catastrophic. Reserve mobilization proceeded as fast as possible, but units needed hours to reach the front. Those hours might be too late.

Israeli tank commanders in the sector, dramatically outnumbered and facing enemy armor with nightfighting advantages, employed every tactical trick they knew. Centurion showcal tanks used their superior gun depression -10° compared to the T-55’s -5° to position hull down behind terrain features. Syrian tanks advancing over hills found themselves silhouetted against the sky while Israeli tanks remained concealed below the crest. When Syrian T-55s crested hilltops, their limited gun depression meant they had to drive fully over the hill before they could depress their guns sufficiently to engage Israeli tanks in the valley below.

This gave Israeli gunners several seconds of free shooting against exposed targets. Dozens of Syrian tanks were destroyed using this technique. But the sheer weight of Syrian numbers meant even catastrophic losses didn’t stop their advance. Fresh battalions replaced destroyed ones. The grinding attrition continued throughout the night. By midday, October 7th, Israeli reserve divisions finally arrived on the Golan Heights. These formations included various equipment as units grabbed whatever tanks were available from storage depots. Some reserve battalions found themselves equipped with M51 Shermans, not because these tanks were preferred, but because nothing else was available.

Tank commanders who had crewed modern Centurions or M60 patents in the Six-Day War now climbed back into World War II era vehicles they hoped never to use in combat again. The operational reality was simple. Syrian armor was advancing. Every tank capable of firing was needed, even upgraded Shermans. Israeli crews took their positions, loaded heat ammunition, and moved toward the sound of battle. The combat on Golan Heights in October 1973 differed substantially from Sinai desert fighting in 1967.

The terrain was more restricted with hills, waddis, and volcanic rock formations channeling movement and limiting maneuver options. Syrian forces, having learned hard lessons from their catastrophic defeat 6 years earlier, employed more sophisticated tactics. Soviet advisers emphasized combined arms coordination. Syrian infantry with anti-tank guided missiles accompanied tank formations. Artillery preparation preceded armored assaults. Syrian tank crews received better training in gunnery and battlefield awareness. The technical quality gap between Israeli and Syrian armor had narrowed with Syria’s introduction of T62 tanks mounting 115 mm guns and advanced fire control systems.

None of these factors favored M51 Shermans trying to survive against modern Soviet armor. Documented engagements from the Golden Heights fighting demonstrate both the M51’s continued effectiveness and its increasing vulnerability. Israeli Sherman crews who could maneuver into ambush positions and achieve first shot surprise still destroyed Syrian T-54s and T-55s with heat rounds. The fundamental armor penetration advantage remained, but Syrian crews in 1973 were more alert, better trained, and supported by infantry anti-tank teams. M51s that exposed themselves to prolonged engagements or attempted to fight from disadvantageous positions suffered heavy losses.

The 60 mm mortar added to turret roofs proved invaluable for suppressing Syrian infantry anti-tank teams with smoke and high explosive rounds, protecting the Shermans from missile attacks. Crew accounts emphasize that by 1973, operating an M51 required exceptional situational awareness, constant movement, and ruthless tactical discipline. One mistake meant death. The Sinai front in October 1973 presented different challenges. Egyptian forces executed a meticulously planned crossing of the Suez Canal perfected through years of Soviet supervised training. Within hours, thousands of Egyptian soldiers and hundreds of tanks established bridge heads on the eastern bank.

Israeli counterattacks with modern M60 Magish tanks ran into Egyptian infantry armed with Soviet supplied Sagger anti-tankg guided missiles and RPG7 rocket launchers. Israeli armor doctrine emphasizing aggressive maneuver and offensive action suffered catastrophic casualties against opponents who had trained specifically to defeat exactly those tactics. The battle of El Ferdan Bridge on October 8th demonstrated the changed situation. Israeli armor attacking Egyptian positions was allowed to advance into carefully prepared kill zones, then destroyed by flanking fire and infantry anti-tank weapons.

One battalion lost 21 out of 25 M60 maggot tanks. Total Israeli losses exceeded 100 tanks in a single day’s fighting. The shock of these casualties forced Israeli military leadership to completely reassess their tactical approach. M51 Shermans operating in Sinai during the Yom Kapour War were employed more cautiously than in the Six-Day War. Israeli commanders understood these aging tanks couldn’t survive the intense anti-tank environment created by Egyptian Sagger missiles and masked T-54, T-55, and T62 formations. Sherman units received support and defensive missions rather than offensive breakthrough tasks.

They provided fire support for infantry operations. They reinforced sectors under attack. They conducted local counterattacks against penetrations after Egyptian forces had been weakened by artillery and air strikes. This more conservative employment reflected both the increased threat environment and Israeli military leadership’s recognition that M51s were fundamentally obsolete for modern highintensity combat. The Yom Kapour War ultimately ended in Israeli victory, but at tremendous cost. Israel lost over 800 tanks during three weeks of fighting. Approximately onethird of its entire armored force.

Egyptian and Syrian losses exceeded 2,000 tanks. The scale of armor losses shocked military analysts worldwide. Modern anti-tank guided missiles had proved devastatingly effective. Tank losses in some engagements exceeded anything seen since World War II. The era of mass armor charges without adequate infantry and artillery support was over. Combined arms coordination wasn’t optional anymore. It was survival prerequisite. And aging tanks like the M51 Sherman, no matter how cleverly upgraded, could no longer be relied upon against the latest Soviet equipment and tactics.

Postwar analysis within Israeli Defense Force concluded the M51 had reached the end of its service life. The tank simply couldn’t be upgraded further to remain relevant on modern battlefields. More powerful guns weren’t feasible in the Sherman chassis. Better armor couldn’t be added without making the vehicle too heavy for the suspension. Modern fire control systems and night vision equipment were difficult to integrate with the cramped 40-year-old design. Israeli industry was now producing more capable systems. American military aid following the Yam Kapoor war included hundreds of modern M60 patent tanks.

The strategic calculus that had made Sherman upgrades necessary in the 1960s no longer applied by the mid 1970s. Israel finally had access to adequate numbers of genuinely modern armor. The M51 was withdrawn from frontline Israeli service by 1975. Surviving vehicles were relegated to reserve units, training roles, or conversion to non-combat support vehicles. Some were sold to Chile where they served for another 30 years, making the M51 of the longest lived Sherman variants ever produced. The last Chilean M51s weren’t retired until 2006, 64 years after the first M4 Sherman rolled off American assembly lines.

That extraordinary service life testifies to the fundamental soundness of the original Sherman design and the cleverness of engineers who found ways to keep updating it for changing battlefield requirements. The M51’s combat record speaks to several enduring principles of armored warfare. First, firepower matters more than armor in most engagement scenarios. The M51’s thin armor was a liability, but its powerful gun with heat ammunition allowed it to destroy tanks it couldn’t hope to survive against in prolonged engagements. Second, crew training and tactical skill multiplies equipment effectiveness.

Even obsolete tanks become dangerous when crewed by well-trained soldiers who understand how to maneuver for advantage. Third, technological innovation can extend equipment service life beyond original design expectations, but there are absolute limits. The M51 succeeded in the 1960s and struggled in the 1970s because the baseline Sherman design couldn’t accommodate further improvements needed for modern combat. Fourth, combined arms integration and tactical flexibility matter more than individual equipment quality. Israeli success in the six- day war derived not from superior tanks but from superior integration of armor, infantry, artillery and air power into coordinated operations.

When that integration broke down in early Yom Kipur war fighting, even modern Israeli armor suffered catastrophic losses. The M51 Sherman’s most significant contribution wasn’t its combat record. Impressive though that was, its real significance lies in demonstrating that clever engineering and tactical innovation can overcome apparent technological inferiority. Arab tank crews in 1967 dismissed Shermans as obsolete museum pieces beneath contempt. That dismissal cost them hundreds of modern Soviet tanks destroyed by weapons they didn’t take seriously. Military history repeatedly demonstrates that underestimating opponents because of equipment age is a recipe for disaster.

The Sherman may have been designed in the early 1940s, but Israeli modifications transformed it into a legitimate threat to any tank fielded in the 1960s. That transformation required understanding what capabilities were actually necessary, what the Sherman chassis could physically support, and how to integrate new technology with old platforms. Israeli success wasn’t accidental. It was the result of systematic engineering analysis and ruthless focus on specific combat requirements. The technical specifications tell part of the story. The CN 105 F1 gunfiring OCC 105 F1 heat rounds with 300 mm of armor penetration at 60°.

The shaped charge physics creating hypersonic jets capable of defeating any armor fielded in the 1960s. The Cumins VT8460 diesel engine providing adequate mobility despite the tank’s increased weight. These specifications mattered, but they only mattered because Israeli tank crews understood how to employ them effectively. Knowing that your ammunition can penetrate enemy armor means nothing if you can’t maneuver into position to take the shot. Having a reliable engine is useless if you drive straight into enemy guns. The integration of technology, training, and tactics created the M51’s effectiveness.

Arab military forces learned painful lessons from their defeats. The comprehensive nature of Israeli victory in 1967 shocked Arab military and political leadership. Soviet advisers conducted detailed analyses of what went wrong and how to prevent similar disasters. Equipment was only part of the problem. crew training, tactical flexibility, combined arms coordination, leadership at every level, all required dramatic improvement. The Arab military reforms implemented between 1967 and 1973 showed results in the Yom Kapor War, where Egyptian and Syrian forces performed far more effectively than 6 years earlier.

But those improvements came too late to matter for the thousands of Arab tank crews who died in burning T-54s and T-55s destroyed by enemies they had been taught to dismiss as obsolete. The broader lesson extends beyond Middle Eastern conflicts. Throughout military history, technological superiority has proven less decisive than doctrine, training, and leadership. World War II provided numerous examples. German Panther and Tiger tanks were technically superior to American Shermans in nearly every measurable way. Thicker armor, more powerful guns, better optics.

Yet, American armored forces defeated German Panzer divisions through superior numbers, logistics, combined arms coordination, and tactical flexibility. The Sherman’s advantages weren’t technical specifications. They were reliability, ease of maintenance, and the ability to be produced in massive quantities. Industrial capacity and operational sustainability won that war, not individual tank duels. Soviet T-34 crews on the Eastern Front faced similar situations against German armor. The T-34 was inferior to German Panthers in direct combat, but Soviet forces produced them by the tens of thousands and crewed them with soldiers who learned to leverage mobility and numbers rather than attempting to win through technical superiority.

The pattern repeats across conflicts. Superior equipment provides advantages, but rarely proves decisive absent superior doctrine and training to employ it effectively. Modern militaries continue grappling with these same questions. How much should be invested in cuttingedge technology versus proven reliable systems? When does upgrading existing platforms make more sense than procuring entirely new equipment? How do training and tactical innovation multiply the effectiveness of whatever equipment is available? The M51 Sherman provides a case study in answering these questions. Israeli military leadership in the 1950s and60s faced resource constraints that made purchasing large quantities of modern tanks impossible.

They had to make do with what was available and affordable. Rather than accepting inferiority, they identified specific capabilities they needed, found creative ways to integrate those capabilities into existing platforms, and trained their crews to leverage the resulting system strengths while mitigating weaknesses. The engineering challenge was substantial, but achievable. Mounting a modern tank gun in a World War II turret required solving numerous problems related to recoil, balance, structural stress, and ammunition storage. Bourge arsenal engineers working closely with Israeli technical specialists systematically addressed each issue.

When the fulllength AMX30 gun proved unworkable, they shortened it. When recoil forces remained too extreme, they redesigned the muzzle brake. When turret balance became problematic, they added counterweights. The solution wasn’t elegant. The M51 looked ungainainely with its oversized gun and bulbous counterweight. But elegance wasn’t the requirement. Battlefield effectiveness was the requirement. And by that measure, the M51 succeeded spectacularly. The human cost of armored warfare remains sobering regardless of which side achieved victory. Tank crews on all sides faced terrifying combat conditions.

Modern armor provides protection, but catastrophic penetration results in horrific casualties. Shaped charged jets burning through armor plate create lethal fragments and secondary effects. Ammunition detonations blow turrets dozens of meters from hull wreckage. Fuel fires emulate crews trapped in damaged vehicles. Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian tank crews died by the thousands in burning Soviet armor. Israeli crews died in their upgraded Shermans, Centurions, and Patton. The technology that made tanks effective weapons also made them death traps when penetrated. Veterans from all sides report the psychological trauma of watching crew members die, of barely escaping burning vehicles, of continuing to fight knowing the next hit might be theirs.

Egyptian tank commander accounts from 1967, collected by military historians in subsequent decades, described the shock of facing Israeli armor in Sinai. They had been trained on Soviet equipment by Soviet instructors using Soviet doctrine. They had been assured of their technical superiority. The T-54 and T-55 represented the pinnacle of postwar Soviet tank design. Egyptian crews felt confident, even invincible. Then Israeli shells started punching through their armor from impossible angles. Tanks that were supposed to be obsolete were destroying modern Soviet armor with apparent ease.

Egyptian commanders struggled to understand what was happening. Intelligence briefings hadn’t mentioned Israeli Shermans carrying guns capable of penetrating T-54 frontal armor. Soviet advisers had no explanation for the losses. The psychological impact of this realization that their supposedly superior equipment offered no protection contributed to the collapse of Egyptian morale and unit cohesion that turned organized retreat into panicked route. Israeli tank crews faced their own challenges and fears. Climbing into an M-51 Sherman, knowing you were driving a fundamentally obsolete vehicle with thin armor against modern opponents, required courage and faith in training.

Israeli tankers understood the technical reality. Their armor wouldn’t stop T-54 main gun rounds. A single hit would likely penetrate and kill the crew. Survival depended entirely on not getting hit, which meant perfect execution of tactical maneuvers, superior gunnery to achieve first shot kills, and sometimes simple luck. Veterans describe the constant tension of operating these tanks. Every moment in combat carried the knowledge that you were one mistake, one moment of bad luck away from death. The M51’s gun gave them a fighting chance, but it was only a chance, not a guarantee.

The broader geopolitical context shaped these conflicts and their outcomes. The Middle East became a Cold War proxy battleground where American and Soviet equipment faced each other indirectly. Soviet military prestige was tied to the performance of T-54s, T-55s, and later T62s in Arab hands. American military reputation connected to Israeli success with Western equipment and training. Both superpowers watched these conflicts closely, drawing conclusions about their equipment’s effectiveness and adjusting doctrine accordingly. Soviet military analysts after 1967 concluded that Arab defeats resulted primarily from poor training and tactical employment rather than equipment deficiencies.

This assessment had some validity. The T-54 and T-55 were capable tanks that performed effectively in other conflicts when properly employed. But Soviet analysis downplayed the effectiveness of Western anti-tank weapons, particularly heat ammunition, which would prove problematic in later conflicts. American military observers drew different conclusions. Israeli success validated several aspects of Western military doctrine. Combined arms coordination proved essential. Crew training and tactical flexibility multiplied equipment effectiveness. Aggressive offense when properly executed could shatter even prepared defenses. But American analysts also noted Israeli vulnerabilities.

The Yam Kapoor war demonstrated that anti-tankg guided missiles posed serious threats to armor. Tankpure formations without adequate infantry and artillery support suffered catastrophic casualties. The lessons learned from Israeli experiences in 1967 and 1973 influenced American armor doctrine development through the 1970s and 80s, contributing to the airland battle concept that emphasized integrated combined arms operations. The M51 Sherman’s retirement from Israeli service marked the end of an era. The last direct link between World War II and modern armored warfare was severed.

Israeli armored forces fully modernized with Merkava tanks domestically designed and produced to meet specific Israeli requirements. The Merkava incorporated lessons learned from decades of Middle Eastern combat, including heavy emphasis on crew protection, battlefield durability, and the ability to fight effectively in the specific terrain and tactical conditions of Israeli borders. The technological sophistication gap between early M51s and modern maravas spans generations. Yet the underlying principles remain constant. Firepower matters. Crew training matters. Tactical flexibility matters. These principles proved valid whether applied to upgraded World War II tanks or cuttingedge modern armor.

Chilean service extended the M51’s operational life into the 21st century. Chile purchased approximately 60 M51s from Israel in the mid 1970s, valuing the powerful 105 mm gun and proven combat record. Chilean crews operated these tanks through the 1980s and 90s, gradually upgrading them with improved fire control systems and communications equipment. The final Chilean M51s weren’t retired until 2006, making them among the last Shermanbased tanks in active military service anywhere in the world. This extraordinary longevity speaks to the fundamental robustness of the Sherman design and the effectiveness of Israeli modifications.

Few military vehicles remain combat relevant 64 years after initial production. The M51’s ability to do so required both excellent original design and inspired modification. Museums worldwide now preserve M51 Shermans as historical artifacts. These surviving vehicles tell stories of engineering innovation, tactical necessity, and the soldiers who crewed them in desperate combat. Walking around a preserved M51, you can see the modifications that transformed it. The massive 105 mm gun, inongruously large for the relatively small turret, the counterwe bolted to the turret rear.

The widened tracks and strengthened suspension. The accumulated modifications represent countless engineering hours solving practical problems. Each solution enabled Israeli tank crews to compete against more modern opponents. Each upgrade bought more years of service life from a fundamentally obsolete platform. The M51’s story resonates because it defies easy categorization. It wasn’t the best tank of its era by any measurable standard. Modern Soviet and Western designs offered superior armor, mobility, fire control, and crew comfort. Yet, in the specific circumstances where it fought, crewed by well-trained Israeli soldiers employing innovative tactics, the M51 proved devastatingly effective.

It destroyed hundreds of enemy tanks while suffering relatively modest losses. It enabled a numerically inferior force to achieve decisive victory against better equipped opponents. It demonstrated that creative engineering and tactical excellence can overcome apparent technological inferiority. These lessons remain relevant for military forces worldwide facing similar challenges of resource constraints and numerical disadvantage. The technical evolution from M4 Sherman to M51 Super Sherman represents one of the most dramatic tank upgrade programs ever attempted. The original M4, designed in 1941, mounted a 75 mm gun, weighed 30 tons, and was intended to fight German medium tanks in North Africa and Europe.

The M51, finalized in 1965, mounted a 105 mm gun, weighed 40 tons, and was designed to destroy Soviet heavy tanks in Middle Eastern desert warfare. The two vehicles shared a chassis and basic layout, but represented completely different combat capabilities separated by 25 years of weapons development. That Israeli engineers successfully bridged that gap speaks to both their technical skill and the soundness of the original Sherman design. Arab dismissal of the M51 as obsolete reflected reasonable assumptions based on visible characteristics.

The Sherman was a World War II design. Everyone knew that its armor was thin by post-war standards. Its mobility was adequate, but unimpressive. Soviet intelligence briefings emphasized these vulnerabilities, assuring Arab tank crews that their modern armor would easily defeat any Sherman variant. What intelligence failed to adequately emphasize was the gun. That 105 mm cannonfiring heat rounds represented a generational leap in anti-armour capability. The shaped charge warhead could defeat any armor fielded in the 1960s. Regardless of how that warhead was delivered, whether fired from a modern tank or an upgraded World War II vehicle made no difference to the molten metal jet burning through steel plate.

Arab crews learned this lesson the hardest way possible. when their supposedly invulnerable tanks exploded around them in the Sinai desert. The title of this story references that dismissal and its consequences. Arabs dismissed the M51 Sherman as obsolete, viewing it with contempt as a museum piece unworthy of serious consideration. Then Israeli heat rounds destroyed dozens of T-54s, shattering both the physical tanks and the psychological confidence of their crews. The reversal was complete. Obsolete defeated modern. Old triumphed over new.

David’s sling struck down Goliath once again. This time in the form of French guns mounted on American chassis, destroying Soviet armor in the Middle Eastern desert. The M51 Sherman stands as testament to what determined soldiers and creative engineers can accomplish when necessity demands innovation. It wasn’t supposed to work. A World War II tank chassis couldn’t mount a modern tank gun. Thin armor couldn’t survive against Soviet heavy tanks. Obsolete mobility couldn’t compete with modern designs. Yet, it did work.

Israeli tank crews proved that technical specifications matter less than how equipment is employed. Arab forces learned that dismissing opponents based on equipment age is a fatal mistake. The legacy endures in modern military thinking. When planners evaluate whether to upgrade existing platforms or procure entirely new systems, the M51 provides a case study in successful modernization. When tacticians consider how to defeat numerically or technologically superior opponents, Israeli employment of upgraded Shermans offers lessons in leveraging specific advantages while mitigating weaknesses.

When historians analyze the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the M51’s performance demonstrates how crew quality and tactical innovation multiply equipment effectiveness. Egyptian tank commanders in June 1967 expected easy victory. They had modern Soviet armor. They had numerical superiority. They had prepared defensive positions. What they didn’t have was adequate training, tactical flexibility or proper respect for their opponents capabilities. That combination proved fatal. When the shooting started, technical advantages evaporated. Modern tanks burned just as readily as obsolete ones when hit by heat rounds in vulnerable locations.

Superior numbers meant nothing when formations collapsed under unexpected attacks from unexpected directions. The prepared defensive positions became death traps when Israeli armor appeared from flanks and rear rather than attacking frontally as Egyptian doctrine predicted. The hundreds of destroyed T-54s and T-55s scattered across the Sinai Desert after the Six-Day War told a story Arab military forces struggled to accept. They had been defeated not by superior equipment, but by superior soldiers. The tanks that destroyed them weren’t modern marvels, but upgraded relics crewed by exceptionally well-trained men who understood their profession.

Soviet advisers could provide equipment and doctrine, but they couldn’t provide the intangible qualities that made Israeli armored forces so effective. Initiative, tactical flexibility, aggressive leadership, and absolute commitment to mission accomplishment regardless of odds. The M51 Sherman destroyed dozens of T-54s because Israeli engineers gave it a weapon capable of penetrating Soviet armor. and Israeli tank crews knew exactly how to employ that weapon for maximum effect. The combination of technology and training, engineering and tactics, created a weapon system far more capable than its appearance suggested.

Arab dismissal of that system as obsolete was understandable, but catastrophically wrong. In warfare, respect for your opponent’s capabilities matters more than confidence in your own equipment. Egyptian tank crews learned that lesson in burning T-54s across the Sinai. By then, it was far too late.